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Abstract In this short note we give a polynomial-time quantum reduc-
tion from the vectorization problem (DLP) to the parallelization problem
(CDHP) for group actions. Combined with the trivial reduction from par-
allelization to vectorization, we thus prove the quantum equivalence of
both problems.
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1 Introduction
In 1997, Couveignes introduced the notion of a hard homogeneous space [2], es-
sentially a free and transitive finite abelian group action ∗ : G×X → X which is
easy to compute while certain computational problems are hard. In Couveignes’
terminology, these problems are vectorization and parallelization, named by ana-
logy with the archetypical example of a homogeneous space: a vector space acting
on affine space by translations (cf. Figure 1). The vectorization problem is: given
x and g∗x in X , compute g ∈ G. The parallelization problem is: given x, g∗x,
and h∗x in X , compute gh∗x ∈ X . The group-exponentiation analogues of
these problems are more commonly referred to as the discrete logarithm problem
(DLP) and the computational Diffie–Hellman problem (CDHP).
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Figure 1. The vectorization and parallelization problems.
It is evident that parallelization reduces to vectorization: recover g from g∗x,
then apply g to h∗x to obtain gh∗x. In the classical group-exponentiation set-
ting, the other direction is much more subtle. The reduction essentially relies on
the existence of auxiliary algebraic groups of smooth group order over Fqi , where
the qi are the prime divisors of the order of the group in which the DLP and
CDHP are defined. The first result was given by den Boer [4] who showed the
DLP and CDHP to be equivalent in F×p when p is a prime such that the Euler
totient ϕ(p−1) is smooth. The auxiliary groups are simply F×qi for each prime di-
visor qi | p−1, and the smoothness assumption implies that the DLP in each F
×
qi
is easy. Maurer [6] generalized this result to arbitrary cyclic groups G, assuming
that for each large prime divisor qi of |G|, there exists an efficiently constructible
elliptic curve E/Fqi whose group order is smooth. On classical computers, these
reductions do not apply in the group-action setting [8, §11].
In this short note, we show that there exists a polynomial-time quantum
reduction from the vectorization to the parallelization problem for group actions
without relying on any extra assumptions, thereby proving the polynomial-time
equivalence of both problems in the quantum setting.
For twenty years, there was little interest in the hard-homogeneous-spaces
framework, since all known (conjectural) instantiations were either painfully slow
to compute with in practice or already captured by the group-exponentiation
point of view. However, interest in these one-way group actions has reemerged
due to the current focus on post-quantum cryptography. In particular,CSIDH [1]
is a comparably efficient homogeneous space that appears to be post-quantum
secure. The construction is based on the action of the ideal-class group cl(O) of
an imaginary quadratic order O on the set of elliptic curves with endomorphism
ring O through isogenies (modulo some identifications). Since this scheme and
its earlier, less practical, variants [2, 9, 3] are our main applications, we will in
the following write a, b, . . . for elements of the group G, and let E denote an
element of the homogeneous space X .
2 The reduction
Let pi be an algorithm that solves the parallelization problem for a homogeneous
space G ×X → X . In other words, pi takes a∗E and b∗E and returns ab∗E.
We show that quantum access to a quantum circuit that computes pi allows one
to solve the vectorization problem in polynomial time.
Lemma. Given an element a∗E ∈ X, one can compute an ∗E for any integer
n ≥ 0 using Θ(log n) queries to pi.
Proof. One performs double-and-add in the “implicit group” [8] using the oracle
pi : (ax∗E, ay ∗E) 7→ ax+y ∗E for addition and doubling. ⊓⊔
Theorem. Given a perfect (classical or) quantum parallelization algorithm pi,
there exists a quantum algorithm that recovers a from elements E and a∗E in X
in polynomial time.
Proof. Using only the public description of G, one can compute the group struc-
ture Z/d1 × · · · × Z/dr of G together with a basis {g1, . . . , gr} ⊆ G in quantum
polynomial time using Kitaev’s generalisation [5] of Shor’s algorithm [7].
Now, for x ∈ Zr, write gx =
∏r
i=1 g
xi
i and define
f : Zr × Z −→ X
(x, y) 7−→ gx ∗ (ay ∗E) ,
where ay ∗E is computed using the Lemma.5 Using the circuit for pi one can
construct a quantum circuit that computes f . The function f is clearly a group
homomorphism (to the implicit group on X), hence defines an instance of the
hidden-subgroup problem with respect to its kernel, i.e., the lattice
L = {(x, y) ∈ Zr × Z : gx+yv = 1 ∈ G} ,
where v ∈ Zr is any vector such that a = gv.6 This (abelian) hidden-subgroup
problem can be solved in polynomial time again using Shor’s algorithm. Finally,
any vector in L of the form (x, 1) satisfies g−x = a, hence yields a representation
of a, and in particular a itself. ⊓⊔
Remark. It is unclear how to perform the reduction above when pi is only guaran-
teed to succeed with non-negligible probability α, meaning that the probability
over all triples (E, a∗E, b∗E) ∈ X3 that the oracle outputs ab∗E is at least α.
In the classical setting, it is straightforward to amplify the success probability
of pi by using random self reduction of problem instances [8, §11]: one computes
lists of possible values of ab∗E by blinding the inputs and unblinding the out-
puts, and uses majority vote to determine the correct result. Any non-negligible
failure probability can be achieved using polynomially many queries to pi.
However, in Shor’s algorithm, it seems that one requires exponentially small
failure probability: The algorithm works by building a big superposition of all
(exponentially many) input-output pairs of the function f , which means that a
polynomial number of repetitions is not enough to make all states in the super-
position correct with high probability. We leave the analysis of the behaviour of
Shor’s algorithm in the presence of errors as an open problem.
5 For negative y, one may generally take a positive representative modulo the exponent
lcm(d1, . . . , dr) of G. This is not needed in the CSIDH setting, since a
−1 ∗E can be
obtained by merely quadratic-twisting a∗E.
6 Note that v is only defined modulo the relation lattice R = d1Z ⊕ · · · ⊕ drZ of G
with respect to g1, . . . , gr. The choice of v does not matter since L ⊇ R⊕ {0}.
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